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Abstract
This thesis argues that there exists a social contract between the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) and the Chinese people. The contract states that
the Communist Party will deliver economic growth and in return the people
will not rebel. This relationship is examined through a game theoretical
setting. First, I present the basic Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) model and
it’s main insight; that democratization is a consequence of the elite’s inability
to commit to future transfers unless they give away de facto power to the
people by introducing democracy. This dynamic is fueled by the elite’s fear
of revolution from the poor.
Second, I expand this basic model by using durable investments instead of
lump sum transfers. This increases the ability of the elite to commit to
redistribution over time, increasing the probability that the elite manage to
use investments to prevent democratization, and making it less likely that
the elite will choose to repress the populace.
The thesis then goes on to present a quick overview of Chinese history, where
the main point is to show that China is far behind its potential. It was the
worlds leading economy in 1820, and I argue that it was the institutional
framework within China, a lack of focus on technology, and Mao’s reforms
that lead to two ‘lost centuries’ of growth. This history is important because
it affects the perceptions of China’s leaders today, and the turmoils of the
past have made social stability one of the main goals of Chinese policy, further
increasing the likelihood of the existence of a social contract.
I then apply the expanded model to the institutional framework of the Chi-
nese state in the period from after the cultural revolution until today, and
argue that the expanded model gives a good description of the structure of
the social contract between the Communist Party and the citizens. By focus-
ing on investments the CCP increases the productivity of the workers, create
economic growth, and promotes social stability. All of this allows the elite
to stay in power. The ability of the elite to do this is more prominent within
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the expanded model than within the base model, and the expanded model
might therefore give a better explanation of current Chinese politics.
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1 Introduction
In this thesis I am first going to quickly present the basic Acemoglu & Robin-
son, (henceforth A&R), model from Acemoglu and Robinson (2000). Sec-
ondly I am going to expand this basic model by using durable investments
instead of lump sum transfers. This increase the ability of the elite to commit
to redistribution over time and therefore increase the probability of the elite
managing to use investments to prevent democratization. I then present a
short overview of Chinese history. Before I finally use the expanded model to
examine the institutional framework of the Chinese state in the period from
1978 to the present, and argue that the expanded model is a good descrip-
tion of the social contract between the Chinese Communist Party and the
Chinese citizens.
1.1 Institutions and Growth
There are several countries that it would have been interesting to use my
expanded model to examine, for example South Korea, Vietnam, China, or
Singapore. But due to the nature of the investment driven economy and the
autocratic government, China is a particularly interesting case to look at.
This is all the more true since China has become more and more important
to the world economy. The focus of the world is in many respects shifting
to the East, sped up by the enormous growth in the region, and this process
has been further increased by the recent financial crisis, where the economies
of the old world seems to be the last to recover.
The premise of the Acemoglu and Robinson approach is that the elite in a
country create an institutional1 framework that helps them maintain power
and extract rents from the population, repressing innovation, property rights
and meritocracy, ultimately preventing growth, and therefore keeping the
country poor. “Egypt is poor because it has been ruled by a narrow elite that
1By institutions I mean the “humanly devised constraints that structure human inter-
action, [. . . ] [they] are the rules of the game” North (1994).
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has organized society for their own benefit at the expense of the vast mass
of people” (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012, p. 3). But if the elite can control
institutions to their own benefit, why would they ever agree to implementing
democracy? Why did the elites in Western Societies during the nineteenth
and early twentieth century extend voting rights to the majority of the adult
population if this led to an increased level of taxation on the same elites?
Acemoglu and Robinson answer that the extension of the franchise was a
commitment device that the elite used to prevent revolution from the more
numerous citizens. The elite were forced to implement democracy since the
promise of monetary transfers alone lacked credibility, and the alternative
was revolution.
In “Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy”, which can be viewed
as the most advanced form of their model, and in their recent book “Why
Nations Fail”, A&R focus on China as an example of a state that do not pla-
cate their constituencies, but instead use repression to be able to refrain from
concessions (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). I, however, argue throughout
this thesis that it is natural to see China as a repressive regime, but that it
is also quite possible and might be very interesting to view China as using
a different form of transfer to prevent revolution. Instead of supplying cash
transfers or services to the citizens, the elite in China have committed to
providing economic growth.
I therefore extend the A&R model so that economic growth, modelled as
lasting investments, can be one of the ways the elite can prevent a revolution.
The idea is simply that the Chinese Communist Party has committed to
delivering growth through a social contract2 with the Chinese people, stating
that as long as the economy improves, the Chinese Communist Party stays
in power and the citizens do not revolt.
2I here use the concept of a social contract quite loosely, I do not use the common
argument of Locke that “government derives its just powers from the consent of the gov-
erned,” Locke, John (2011), but argue implicitly that the absence of an effective rebellion
against the social contract is the only legitimacy it needs Pettit (2012). If we use this last
criterion, it is easier to argue that a social contract does indeed exist in China.
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1.2 Actualization - The Arab Spring
When A&R started their work on democratization, back in 1997, and claimed
that democratization was a response from the ruling elite to prevent rebellion,
they found historic evidence of this effect from e.g. The Glorious Revolution
in England in 16683, Germany before the first world war, Britain in the
eighteen hundreds, as well as France and Sweden (Acemoglu and Robinson,
2000, p. 1182).
The argument of A&R are now thoroughly corroborated by the recent upris-
ings in the Middle East. The Arab Spring shows not only that rebellions are
a viable way for the poor to rise up against the elite that runs the country,
but also that the elite responds very much in accordance with what the A&R
theory predicts, using repression, outright bribery, and even democratization
to prevent revolution.
The Arab Spring began in Tunisia, and has so far caused rulers to be ousted
in Egypt, Libya, and Yemen, while civil uprisings are ongoing in Bahrain and
Syria. The common rallying cry is that “The people wants to bring down
the regime” (Abulof, Uriel, 2011). The responses from the regimes have been
varied. It is for example normal for the gulf countries to subsidize the gas
price. This can be seen as a very visible and easily verifiable way to signal
to the citizens that they are indeed well taken care of by the current rulers
(Kru¨ger, 2010). During the uprisings, the emir in Kuwait gave 4000$ to each
and every Kuwaiti citizen, as well as fourteen months of food rations (Kru¨ger,
2011). While in Saudi Arabia they raised public sector wages and announced
social benefits and cash handouts worth about US$130 billion (Miller, 2012,
p. 2), both clear excamples of the elite using transfers to calm the citizens.
Other regimes in the region choose a different approach in response to the
uprisings. Syria i.e. does not have the oil wealth of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia,
and the elite therefore have only two options left, (according to the A&R’s
model): to repress the population, or democratize. They choose repression.
This decision led to a revolt from the people, and a civil war that is yet to
3See North, and Weingast (1989) for more about this
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be concluded.
All of these examples show that the framework of A&R has clear predictive
value, and is not just a theoretical exercise. Even though it simplifies and
formalizes a complicated problem, it yields interesting insights. And even
though the Middle East would be a very interesting place to apply the model
to, the Chinese case is where I will focus my attention throughout the rest
of the thesis. I further limit my centre of attention to the strategies of
transfers/investments or democratization and do not focus on the strategy
of repressing the citizens.4
4See for example Acemoglu and Robinson (1997) and (2006) for models dealing with
repression strategies.
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2 The Acemoglu & Robinson Model
Acemoglu and Robinson (2000), looks at why the elite in Western Societies
during the nineteenth and early twentieth century extended voting rights to
the majority of the adult population. They also argue that this extension
(of the franchise), led to an increase in internal redistribution of wealth and
a downturn of the Kuznets Curve. The question is why did the elites extend
the franchise if this led to an increased level of taxation? A&R answer
that the extension of the franchise was a commitment device that the elite
used to prevent revolution from the more numerous citizens. The elite were
forced to implement democracy since the promise of monetary transfers alone
lacked credibility. A&R use historical evidence from Germany, England,
Sweden, and France to support their argument (Acemoglu and Robinson,
2000, p. 1167).
2.1 The Model Setup
A&R’s model describes an infinite horizon economy with a continuum of
size 1 of agents, where a proportion λ > 1/2 of agents are “poor”, while
the rest, 1 − λ, is a rich “elite”. I will use the terms “rich” and “elite”
interchangeably throughout the thesis. The same applies to the terms “poor”
and “citizen(s)”. All agents, whether rich or poor, are treated as identical
(Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000, p. 1169). As we see, the citizens are more
numerous than the elite, and therefore in full democracy the median voter
will be a poor citizen that can (and will) choose to set a tax rate higher than
the elite prefer.
The agents in the model consume a generic consumer good, and can choose to
allocate their capital in a way that either uses market technology, but makes
the proceeds eligible for taxation, or a less productive home technology, where
the production can not be taxed. This creates a natural ceiling to the possible
level of taxation, both in a democracy and in elite rule.
All agents have identical preferences, represented by a linear indirect utility
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function over net income, and discount future income by β ∈ [0, 1). Everyone,
both poor and rich, are taxed at a rate τ and get a transfer T . In the
beginning political power is concentrated in the hands of the elite, but the
poor agents can at any time overthrow the government.
If the poor attempt a revolution, it always succeeds. In the event of a rev-
olution the poor then get to distribute the capital in society evenly among
themselves, except for a part that gets destroyed during the revolution. The
rich end up with nothing. A revolution is in other words a large scale re-
distribution from the rich to the poor. The amount of capital the citizens
manage to expropriate depends on the degree of ‘revolutionary threat’, that
is the level of µ. µ is stochastic and can either be µh (high) or µl (low) with
the probability Pr(µ = µh) = q, regardless of whether µ was high or low the
previous period (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000, p. 1169-1171).
This changing value of µ captures the fact that the elite can not prevent the
revolution indefinitely by committing to a long term subsidy of the citizens,
because the citizens know that the elite will renege on their promise as soon
as the threat of revolution is gone. Therefore the elite must find a way to
credibly commit to permanent transfers to prevent social unrest. If we look
at this problem in a game theoretical setting, then the act of extending the
franchise is a solution of the game. The rich elite introduce democracy to
prevent the revolution from happening.
Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, p. 1171) sum up the various steps of the game
in this way:
1. The state µ is revealed, observed by all players
2. The elite decide whether or not to extend the franchise. If
they decide not to extend the franchise, they set the tax rate.
3. The poor decide whether or not to initiate a revolution. If
there is a revolution, they share the remaining output. If there is
no revolution and the franchise has been extended, the tax rate
is set by the median voter (a poor agent).
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4. The capital stock is allocated between market and home pro-
duction, and incomes are realized.
2.1.1 A&R’s Main Model of Democratization
Because we treat the individuals in each of the two groups as identical, this
economy can be represented as a dynamic game between two players: the
elite and the poor. A&R characterize the pure Markov Perfect Equilibria of
the game, where strategies only depend on the current state of the game and
not the entire history of the game. The game is further dependent on who is
in control politically and the level of revolutionary threat.
In A&R(2000), the game ends after either democracy or revolution, and
continues indefinitely until either of these states are obtained. The possible
actions of the poor are: revolution or no revolution. While the rich can
choose to extend the franchise or the tax level. Thus a pure Markov Perfect
equilibrium is a strategy combination, σr, dependent on the political state
and the revolutionary threat, and a strategy, σp, dependent on the political
state, the possible extension of the franchise and the tax level, such that these
strategies are best responses to each other for all µ’s and political states.
A&R use Bellman equations to characterize the equilibria of the game, where
V p(·), and V r(·) are different value functions depending on the various states
and actions. For example: in state σt=0(E, µ
l), the elite have political power
and there is no threat of revolution.
The game tree, Figure 1, nicely illustrates the various payoffs in the game:5
5I thought it prudent to give a graphical description of the various strategies of the
game, even though the proper explanation of the notation in Figure 1 is not given before
Section 3
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Figure 1: Step 1- 4
Here, player N is nature, R is the rich, and P is the poor. The choice Ex
is to extend the franchise and the choice Ex is not to extend the franchise.
Similarly with transfer, τ , and no transfer, τ¯ . Rev is revolution, and Rev is
no revolution.
As we can see from Figure 1, the payoffs of a revolution in the bottom
half of the game tree, where µ = µl, is 0 for both the citizens and the elite,
independent on the choices of the rich beforehand. We also know that as long
as µ = µl, there is no true revolutionary threat so the elite will play τ = 0,
and they will not extend the franchise. Therefore the only viable branch of
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this part of the game tree, µ = µl, is V p(µl, E, τ) = Ahp, V r(µl, E) = Ahr,
where we see the poor ends up with; T = 0 transfers, no democracy, and the
rich get to keep all their resources.
In the top half of Figure 1, we see that there are more interesting results. If
the rich do not give the poor any transfers, and do not introduce democracy,
the threat of revolution is quite real. So the question the rich face is whether
it is cheaper to pay off the poor with transfers, or if the gains from a revolution
is so large for the poor that the elite will have to introduce democracy to
prevent the revolution. This, as we see in the paragraph below, all depends
on the level of q.
2.1.2 Restricting the Model
A&R restrict the game in two ways, first by assuming that the payoff for the
poor of a one time payment from the rich can not be larger than the gains
from revolution. This makes sense since they argue throughout the paper
that it is the lack of certainty in future transfers that causes the threat of
revolution to eventually bring forth democracy. The second restriction is that
the payoff from revolution cannot be larger than the gains from democracy.
If the opposite were true, we would have seen a lot more revolutions than
democracies, and their argument would not hold.
This then creates a ‘level’ of probability q of µh, that is the probability of
having a high revolutionary threat in the next period, that gives the appro-
priate response from the elite and the citizens. So if: q < q∗ generally is
true, then the revolutionary threat will be met with franchise extension, and
as a result the max tax rate. If however: q > q∗, then the threat will be
met with temporary redistribution at a level that just equals the payoff of a
revolution6.
The consequence of this setup is that the rich play the strategy of extending
the franchise when q < q∗, even though this leads to a higher total tax
6See Section 4, Proposition 1, or Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) for a more detailed
explanation of these effects.
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burden for the rich over time. This happens because the poor know that
transfers now and a promise of transfers in the future is not credible, and
would therefore prefer a revolution unless the franchise is extended. A&R
argue that this is the path that Britain, Sweden and France took.
The other result is, paradoxically, that a stable revolutionary threat would
not lead to revolution, but rather lead to a level of constant transfer from the
elite to the poor. A&R argue that this is what happened in Germany before
the first world war. The socialist party in Germany was the most developed,
and therefore the ruling elite got a constant reminder of the revolutionary
threat. This reminder equalled a revolutionary threat higher than q∗. In
other words, q was high enough over time to make the promise of future
transfers credible, so there were no ‘need’ for a revolution, and the poor
ended up with regular transfers. If we then examine history, we see that
Germany did indeed implement the welfare state, while Britain and France,
which did not have this constant reminder, ended up extending the franchise.
2.2 Extensions
In the book “Economic Origins of Democracy and Dictatorship”(2006), A&R
expand their basic model in a number of different ways, for example adding
a middle class, the possibility of a coup from the rich after democracy is
implemented, the option of repressing the citizens, and targeted transfers.
They also create a dynamic model environment (Acemoglu and Robinson,
2006, p. 20).
A&R do not, however, focus on economic growth, and this is where my small
contribution comes in. In the rest of the thesis I am going to examine at how
the elite can enhance the productivity of the poor over time by investing in
lasting productivity increasing infrastructure, instead of handing out lump
sum transfers in each period. After I have developed this extension, I am
going to argue that this is the ‘social contract’ we have seen in China from
after the Cultural Revolution and until the present day.
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3 An Expanded Model of Democratization
3.1 Introduction
In this section I present the changes to the basic A&R model. I let the
elite be able to invest in infrastructure that increases the productivity of the
poor, and therefore increases their consumption possibilities. I also introduce
a dynamic environment with depreciation, that reduces the productivity of
the poor unless there are new investments. In sum, these changes lead to
an increased ability for the elite to commit to future productivity growth for
the poor, and this gives, as we shall see, an increased freedom in how to deal
with the threat of rebellion.
3.2 The Model Set Up
3.2.1 The Economy and it’s Participants
Just like in A&R (2000), I consider an infinite horizon economy, with a
continuum of size 1 of agents, where a proportion λ of agents are “poor”,
while the rest 1−λ is a rich “elite”. All agents of the various groups, rich (r)
and poor (p) are treated as identical. There is a unique consumption good y
with price normalized to unity that can be produced in two ways, both linear
in productivity. Either it can be produced using market technology; Ai, (i =
p, r), or it can be produced in the informal sector using home technology;7
Bi. Where the rich and the poor have access to different home technologies,
and Bp = 0. The rich have a productivity of Ar in every period, while the
poor have the productivity Apt . For simplicity the production function is only
dependent on the different levels of productivity,8 thus yp = Apt , and y
r = Ar.
7The home technology of the poor can be viewed as “returning to the farm” to do
subsistence farming, thus Bp = 0, while the rich, on the other hand, has a real alternative
to produce in the home sector since, Br > 0.
8This is a change from A&R, who vary the capital hi, and keep the productivity
constant, while I keep the capital h constant and equal to 1. Thus in my model: yi = Aith
i,
where hi = 1.
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All agents have identical preferences represented by a linear indirect utility
function over net income, and a discount factor β ∈ [0, 1). In my model I
make the rich able to invest in infrastructure that enhances the productivity
of the poor, see Equation (1). The citizens can not perform this investment
themselves.9
As we saw, I assume that the poor and the rich have access to different
informal technologies, and that market technology for both the poor and
the rich are more efficient than home production, such that Ar > Br and
Apt > B
p, for all t. The only role of informal sector production is to limit the
taxes to less than a hundred percent, since production in the informal sector
is not taxable, in contrast to production using market technology. So a high
value of Br would mean that the upper limit on the amount of investment
that can be imposed on the rich would be lower. This is because they can
always choose to produce in the informal sector if the forced investment level
is set too high.
In other words, if the median voter in a democracy tried to make the rich pay
more investment than the maximum (Iˆ), we would have I > Iˆ ≡ (Ar −Br),
so the total investment (I) would in fact be 0 because each rich person would
move all production to the informal sector. Therefore Iˆ ≡ (Ar − Br) is the
maximal amount it is possible to make the elite pay, both in order to avoid
democracy and in a democracy.
Post tax income is yr = Ar − I for the rich, and yp = Apt for the poor. The
productivity of the elite is assumed to be Ar > Iˆ/δ, where δ is the rate of
depreciation, making it impossible to keep the poor at the same productivity
level as the rich, even if the rich invest the maximum amount each period.
9This would be similar to making only the rich pay taxes in the A&R model. One
can argue that the assumption, that only the rich pay taxes, is a bit unrealistic, but this
deviation from A&R only highlights the fact that the model rests on the assumption that
the rich pay to avoid revolution. And even in democracy the rich pay more than the poor,
so the gain from taxing the poor as well as the rich does not really manifest, other than
the fact that it makes some of the expressions ‘neater’.
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For the poor the productivity varies in the following way:10
Apt = (1− δ)Apt−1 +
It(1− λ)
λ
(1)
Making the productivity of the poor directly dependent on the level of in-
vestment from the rich.
For the setup described in Equation (1) to make sense, we must have that:
in period t, the rich produce first, then the level of investment It is decided,
and then the poor produce with the productivity Apt dependent on the level
of investment the elite choose in the same period. The reason for this setup
is that since the whole basis of the model is a commitment problem, it seems
unreasonable to create a model where the poor trust the rich enough to
believe the investment will really happen in the next period, i.e. in a period
where the poor might not even have a real revolutionary threat. This is really
a technicality, and have no real consequence for the results of the model either
way, but I feel it makes much more sense to have the investments made in
period t count in period t instead of in period t+ 1.
Equation (1) is important in quite a few respects. First it creates a form of
commitment possibility for the rich that is not an extension of the franchise.
As we see from Equation (1), as long as δ 6= 1 some of the investment the
rich did in period t − 1 remains in period t. And therefore the citizens are
better off not just in the current time period, but also in every period after
period t.
It might be helpful to i.e. view this investment as an investment in a factory,
or some form of infrastructure, that gives the poor the opportunity to work
more efficiently, and therefore increases their productivity. Because of the
model set up, this factory is not producing profit for the rich investors but
only improves the productivity, and therefore the consumption possibilities,
of the poor. It is also not possible to chop up the factory and sell it abroad,
10Here I change the conventional way of writing a dynamic model; usually the investment
bears fruit in the beginning of the next period. The reason for this becomes clear in the
next paragraph
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so by investing they produce some of the same effects as if they had extended
the franchise.
An investment at any time creates several periods where the citizens are bet-
ter off. This would be similar to the rich agreeing to pay to the poor a smaller
and smaller transfer (not investment) over time in the A&R framework. But
this, as we know, is not credible because the rich can renege on their promises,
and the poor therefore have to maximize the one period transfer. Not so if
the elite can invest in an unsellable factory that only benefit the poor. This
is a true commitment over time, and therefore resolves some of the credibility
problem.
3.2.2 Revolution
The citizens, λ, are for all practical purposes excluded from the political
process, but they can at any time t ≥ 0 overthrow the sitting government and
take over the production technology of the rich. If a revolution is attempted
it always succeeds. Post revolution we can therefore imagine that the poor
would appropriate the technology and assets of the rich and distribute them
among themselves. In other words, the poor take control over all the assets
in the economy, but a fraction 1− µt of the technology gets destroyed in the
process. So if there is a revolution at time t, the perpetual discounted value
for the poor would be:11
V p(Apt−1, R) = µt
(
Ar(1− λ)
λ(1− β) +
Apt−1
1− β(1− δ)
)
(2)
In other words, after a revolution, each poor citizen receives a productivity
that is a mix between their old productivity and the rich productivity, de-
pendent on the degree of revolutionary threat, forever. There is no further
investments, but the poor have appropriated a fraction of the productivity
of the elite, they are therefore better off than before the revolution.12 After
11See Appendix A.1.2 for the math.
12In the post revolutionary state, the rich technology, Ar, does not depreciate even when
it is taken over by the poor. This is of no real consequence, but some ways to rationalize
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a revolution the rich are assumed to get13 V r(R) = 0.
It is further assumed that µ is stochastic and changes between two values
µt = µ
h whit the probability q, and µt = µ
l = 0 with the probability 1 − q.
A low value of q would imply that the threat of revolution is rare. This
variation captures the fact that some periods might be more prone to social
unrest than others, and allows us to model that a promise of redistribution
today might not be adhered to tomorrow, because the revolutionary threat
then might be lower. As we see, a low value of µ would mean that a revolution
is very costly, since a big part of the post revolutionary resources would get
destroyed during the revolution.14
The ‘end’ of the model setup is then for the elite to choose whether or not
to extend the franchise. If it is extended the economy becomes a democracy
forever,15 and the median (poor) voter sets the tax rate. The layout of the
game so far is quite close to the layout shown in section 2.1.
3.3 Solving the Game
The game is made easier by using two features of the model setup. Because
we have identical agents, and they therefore have identical preferences, we
can treat all the agents in one of the groups (rich/poor) as one player. This
economy can therefore be characterized as a dynamic game between two
players, the rich elite and the poor citizens. I just follow A&R in saying that
this could be to assume that the workers take better care of the capital because they now
own it themselves, see Craig, and Pencavel (1992) for arguments of this kind. Another
solution is that during the revolution the capital that would be depreciated is destroyed
in the revolution, rendering depreciation after the revolution close to zero. Or one can
imagine that the poor just learned the magic that keeps the rich productivity from being
depreciated in the first place.
13That the rich get nothing is just for simplicity, see i.e. Acemoglu and Robinson (2000)
for more discussion on this.
14If one imagines that the economy has a lot of human capital, this would be very
difficult to expropriate, and this would be the same as a low value on µh
15This is for simplicity, it is quite possible to imagine the elite attempting a coup after
democracy is implemented, think of various countries in Latin America. For a more
thorough discussion on this see for example Acemoglu and Robinson (1999) and Acemoglu
and Robinson (2006).
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the potential free rider problem between the poor agents can be solved by
e.g. only distributing the bounty from a revolution to the actual participants,
rendering it a loss not to take part. It is however perfectly possible to argue
that there exists a real coordination problem.16 As in A&R(2000), I ignore
this issue.
Secondly, the choice of whether to use market or home technology is fairly
simple. As stated earlier, if I > Iˆ ≡ (Ar − B), then each individual rich
person would produce using home technology and there would not be any
way for the elite to get income to deliver the desired level of investment.
This is true both in a Democracy and in Elite rule. Therefore only the
action I ≤ Iˆ is worth our attention, and this, thankfully, reduces the number
of interesting actions to look at.
As A&R, I only characterize the pure strategy Markov Perfect Equilibria of
this game, where the strategies only depend on the current state of the world,
and not on the history of the game.17
3.3.1 The State of the System
The state of the system consists of the current opportunity for revolution;
µlor µh, the current level of Ap, and the political state; P - either Democracy
D, Elite control E or the post revolutionary state R. The action of going
from P = E to P = D, is denoted by φ. If φ = 0, P stays at E and if φ = 1
P switches to D forever. More formally, let σr(µ, P ) be the actions taken by
the elite when the state is µ = µh and P = E or D. This action consists of
a choice between extending the franchise φ = 1 when P = E, or choosing
the level of investment Ir when φ = 0. Similarly σp(Apt−1, µ, P |φ, Ir), are the
actions of the poor. Their actions consists of initiating a revolution, notated
by ρ, where ρ = 1 represent a revolution. The poor also have to select the
level of investment Ip = Iˆ if the political state is P = D. As we see, the
16See for example Apolte (2012) for a thorough discussion of this.
17To see that the general results in the model do not change even outside Markov
Equilibria, see e.g. the appendix in Acemoglu and Robinson (2000).
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actions of the poor are conditioned on the actions of the rich, since the rich
make their choices of possibly investing or extending the franchise before the
poor choose between revolution or no revolution.
A Pure Strategy Markov Perfect Equilibrium is then a strategy combination:
{σr(µ, P ), σp(Apt−1, µ, P |φ, Ir)} such that σr and σp are best responses to each
other for all µ and P .
We can characterize the equilibria of the game by writing the appropriate
Bellman equations. Define V p(Apt−1, R) as the return to the poor citizens if
there was a revolution starting in state µ = µh and where the productivity
of the poor is Apt = A
p
t−1. Since only the value of µ and A
p
t−1 at the time
of revolution matters, V p(Apt−1, R) = µ
(
Ar(1−λ)
λ(1−β) +
Apt−1
1−β(1−δ)
)
, which is the
per period return from revolution for the infinite future discounted to the
present.18 The value function of the rich if there is a revolution is, as we
might recall, V r(R) = 0. The same is true for the poor, V p(Apt−1, R) = 0
when µ = µl = 0, so we see that the poor would never attempt a revolution
when µ = µl.
Therefore, if we examine the state (µl, E), we see that the elite are in power
and that there is no real revolutionary threat. And in any Markov Perfect
Equilibrium, φ = 0 (that is, there is no extension of the franchise), and
Ir = 0, the value of the rich agents is V r(µl, E) = Ar + β
[
(1− q)V r(µl, E)+
qV r(µh, E)
]
. While the value of the poor agents is given by:
V p(Apt−1, µ
l, E) = Apt−1(1− δ)
+ β
[
(1− q)V p(Apt , µl, E) + qV p(Apt , µh, E)
]
(3)
As we see, the poor are dependent on the level of their production technology:
Apt−1, the level of depreciation: δ, as well as the current state of µ.
If we then analyze the state (µh, E), and suppose the elite play φ = 0 and
Ir = 0, in words: neither extend the franchise or invest, then we would have
V p(Apt−1, µ
h, E|φ = 0, Ir = 0) = A
p
t−1(1−δ)+Ir
1−β(1−δ) , where we know that I
r = 0.
18See the Appendix, Section A.1.2 for the math.
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The inequality that would guarantee revolution in this state is if:
V p(Apt−1, R) > V
p(Apt−1, µ
l, E) (4)
So if this is true, µ = µh, and if the rich do not give the poor either franchise
extension or investment, then the citizens will prefer to revolt.
Here I follow A&R in not only using the above revolution constraint Equation
(4), but to use a slightly stronger assumption as a starting point for the
further analysis.
Assumption 1 19
µ
(
Ar(1− λ)
λ(1− β) +
Apt−1
1− β(1− δ)
)
>
Apt−1
{[(1− β(1− δ)](1− δ) + 1 + Iˆ(1− λ)
λ
1− β(1− δ)
}
+
Iˆ(1− λ)
λ
(5)
This assumption is really just; V p(Apt−1, R) > A
p
t−1(1 − δ) + the perpetual
value of receiving the maximum transfer (Iˆ) just one time. In words; re-
distribution for just one period is not supposed to be enough to prevent a
revolution. If µ = µh and the poor get investment from the rich one time,
and do not believe that this will happen again, ever, then this one transfer
should not be enough to prevent a revolt.20
Since V r(R) = 0, revolution is the worst outcome for the rich, and they
will do anything to prevent a revolution from happening. In the model en-
vironment there is two ways they can do this. First, the elite can choose to
maintain political power φ = 0, but redistribute income by investing, in this
case the poor get V p(Apt−1, µ
h, Ir), where Ir is the amount of investment cho-
sen by the rich. Second, they could extend the franchise, that is implement
democracy, and thus give the poor V p(Apt−1, D). But there is no guarantee
19See the Appendix A.1.2 and A.1.3 for the math
20See Acemoglu and Robinson (2006, p. 136-142) for several interesting examples of
revolts, nevertheless stopped this way.
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that either of these actions will be enough to stop a revolution. The poor
would still choose the action that gives them the best long term value. The
choice for the poor is therefore really between:
V p(Apt−1, µ
h, E) = max
{
V p(Apt−1, R);φV
p(Apt−1, D)
+ (1− φ)V p(Apt−1, µh, E, Ir)
}
(6)
In words, this means that the poor would choose the best option between
either revolution or democracy or transfers. It is the elite that can decide if
the decision is between revolution and democracy or between revolution and
a transfer Ir, so for the poor it is always really a choice between two states.
If the elite choose the redistribution strategy that is φ = 0 in Equation (6),
the return to the poor is:
V p(Apt−1, µ
h, E, Ir) = Apt−1(1− δ) + Ir
+ β
[
qV p(Apt , µ
h, E, Ir) + (1− q)V p(At, µl, E)
]
(7)
The elite redistribute some of their income by investing an amount Ir, and
the poor therefore ends up with the productivity they had in the period
before the investment plus the productivity gain from the investment. In
the next period, if µ = µh, investment continue, but if the state switches to
µ = µl then the investment stop, Ir = 0, and the poor get V p(Apt−1, µ
l, E) in
that period. As we see, this illustrates the fact that the elite can not commit
to future investment unless the future also has a real threat of revolution.
However, if the elite choose the ‘extending the franchise‘ strategy, φ = 1,
the comparison for the poor is between V p(Apt−1, R) and V
p(Apt−1, D). The
perpetual return to a rich agent in democracy is simply: V r(D) = A
r−Iˆ
1−β =
Br
1−β , and the returns to a poor agent is:
21
V p(D,Apt−1) =
Apt−1
1− β(1− δ) +
Iˆβ(1− δ)(1− λ)
(1− β[δ + β(1− δ)− 2])λ (8)
21See the Appendix Section A.1.1 for the math
19
To simplify the discussion further I focus on the area of the parameter
space where a democracy actually prevents a revolution. That is where
V p(Apt−1, D) > V
p(Apt−1, R). This second assumption looks like this:
Assumption 2
Apt−1
1− β(1− δ) +
Iˆβ(1− δ)(1− λ)
(1− β[δ + β(1− δ)− 2])λ >
µ
(Ar(1− λ)
λ(1− β) +
Apt−1
1− β(1− δ)
)
(9)
If the value for the poor in a democracy is larger than the value of performing
a revolution, the elite can not prevent the revolution no matter what they do.
Therefore it is much more interesting to look at the parts of the game where
the elite are able to prevent a revolution, and that is when Assumption 2
holds.
3.3.2 A Graphical Explanation of the Game
As we can see in Figure 2, the game has quite a few end states. And it is
these end states that must be compared to find the various strategies of the
elite and the citizens. As in Figure 1, player N is nature, R is the rich, and
P is the poor. The choice Ex is to extend the franchise and the choice Ex is
not to extend the franchise, Rev is revolution, and Rev is no revolution. But
in Figure 2, instead of transfers, we have the choice between Investment, I,
or no investment I¯.
As we can see from Figure 2, the payoffs of a revolution in the bottom half
of the game tree, where µ = µl, is 0 both for the citizens and the elite,
independent on the choices of the rich beforehand. We also know that as
long as µ = µl, there is no true revolutionary threat so the elite will play I,
and they will not extend the franchise. Therefore the only viable branch of
the game tree is V p(µl, E, I) = Apt = (1− δ)Apt−1, andV r(µl, E) = Ar, where
the poor ends up with I = 0 investments and no democracy, and the rich get
to keep all their resources.
20
In the upper half of Figure 2, we see that there are more interesting results. If
the rich neither invest, (so the poor get increased productivity), nor introduce
democracy, the threat of revolution is real. The question the rich face is
whether it is cheaper to pay off the poor with investments, or if the gains
from a revolution is so large for the poor that the elite will have to introduce
democracy to prevent the revolution. This, as we see in Section 4 below, all
depends on the level of q relative to q∗ and the level of δ.
N
R
R
P V
p(E, I) = 1−δ
1−β(1−δ)A
p
t−1, V
r(E) = Ar
V p(R) = Equation (2), V r(R) = 0Rev
Rev
P
V p(E) = Equation (10), V r(D) = Ar − Iˆ
V p(R) = Equation (2), V r(R) = 0Rev
Rev
I
I
R
P V
p(D) = Equation (8), V r(D) = Ar − Ir
V p(R) = Equation (2), V r(R) = 0Rev
Rev
P
V p(D) = Equation (8), V r(D) = Ar − Ir
V p(R, ) = Equation (2), V r(R) = 0Rev
Rev
I
IEx
Ex
R
R
P V
p(E) = Equation (11), V r(D) = Ar
V p(R) = 0, V r(R) = 0Rev
Rev
P
V p(E, Iˆ) = Equation (11), V r(E) = Ar − Iˆ
V p(R) = 0, V r(R) = 0Rev
Rev
I
I
R
P V
p(D) = Equation (8), V r(D) = Ar − Ir
V p(R) = 0, V r(R) = 0Rev
Rev
P
V p(D) = Equation (8), V r(D) = Ar − Iˆ
V p(R) = 0, V r(R) = 0Rev
Rev
I
IEx
Exµ = µ
l
µ = µh
Figure 2: Here I have simplified the notation a bit to get the Figure into one page. I
have basically removed the information you find by following the game tree. So where
µ = µl I do not include µl in the value function, even though this would be more correct.
The same applies to the productivity of the poor: Apt−1, which is in every one of the poor’s
value functions.
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4 Results
Since we know by Assumption 122 that a one time transfer alone is not enough
to prevent a revolution, it is interesting to look at what level of q that makes
the redistribution strategy viable. As we saw in Section 3.2.2, a high q is
the probability of having µ = µh, that is a hight threat of revolution. Let
Vˆ p(Apt−1, µ
h, E|q) be the maximum utility, as a function of the parameter
q, that can be given to the poor without extending the franchise. In other
words, we are interested in finding out what Equation (7) looks like for the
citizens when the elite give the citizens the maximum possible investment,
Iˆ, every time µ = µh.
Here I use the method of undetermined coefficients, also known as “guess
and verify”, to determine the actual value of the two functional equations,
Equation (3) and Equation (7), when Ir = Iˆ. We are mostly interested in
the value when the threat of revolution is high, and I therefore focus on this
state.23 This gives the following result for Equation (7):
Vˆ p(Apt−1, µ
h, E|q) = V p(Apt−1, µh, E, Iˆ) =
1− β(1− q)
(1− β(1− δ))(1− β) Iˆ +
1− δ
1− β(1− δ)A
p
t−1 (10)
Equation (10) now has the following interpretation: The first part
1−β(1−q)
(1−β(1−δ))(1−β) Iˆ can be thought of as the utility today of getting an investment
today, modified by the discounted probability of a utility loss when having
µl in a future period, and therefore no investment in that period.
Analogously, if we look at the true form of Equation (3):
V p(Apt−1, µ
l, E, Iˆ) =
βq
(1− β(1− δ))(1− β) Iˆ +
1− δ
1− β(1− δ)A
p
t−1 (11)
22Equation (5).
23See the Appendix, Section A.2 for the math.
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We see the same expression but with just βqIˆ in the numerator. Here it is
even easier to see this interpretation. The value of an investment for the
poor when they have a low revolutionary threat today, is the probability of
having a high revolutionary threat in the future multiplied with the present
value of this future investment.
If we now look at the rightmost part of both Equation (10) and Equation
(11), that is 1−δ
1−β(1−δ)A
p
t−1 we see that this is the perpetual discounted value
of having the productivity Apt−1 in the previous period, which also is an
interpretation that makes sense.
Now that we know all the end states of the game, that is V p(R), V p(D),
and the value for the poor of a high revolutionary threat where the elite
pay the maximum investment Vˆ p(Apt−1, µ
h, E|q), we can draw the following
conclusions:
If Vˆ p(Apt−1, µ
h, E|q) < V p(Apt−1, R), then the maximum investment that the
elite can make is not adequate to prevent a revolution, and they will have to
implement democracy if they want to have a positive payoff at all. It is also
worth noting that V r(µh, E, Ir) is decreasing in Ir and that it is greater than
V r(D) for all Ir 6= Iˆ. This last comment follows from the fact that as long as
the elite are in power and there is not a democracy yet, it will come a period
where the state is µl, and in this state the rich get to play Ir < Iˆ, unlike
in a democracy where they are ‘forced’ to play Iˆ in all periods. Therefore
V r(µh, E, Ir) > V r(D).
The set up of the model gives us the following nice results: Vˆ p(Apt−1, µ
h, E|q =
1) = V p(Apt−1, D) > V
p(Apt−1, R) by Assumption 2. In words, we see that
if there is no chance for the next state to be µl, then this is just like living
in a democracy for the poor, since they are guaranteed to get the maximum
investment each period. Since we already have assumed that a democracy is
better than a revolution, this argument holds.
The next outcome is that: Vˆ p(Apt−1, µ
h, E|Ir = Iˆ , q = 0) < V p(Apt−1, R) by
Assumption 1. This means that if there is no chance for the state µh to arrive
again, then a one time transfer is not enough to prevent the revolution, since
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this is a ‘once in a lifetime’ opportunity for the citizens, and they know they
can not trust the rich’ promises . Therefore, unless the de facto power is
transferred to the poor by the implementation of a democracy, the citizens
will revolt.
These results proves that there exists a q∗ ∈ [0, 1] such that
Vˆ p(Apt−1, µ
h, E|q∗) = V p(Apt−1, R). And since we got an expression for the
value functions, we know the form of q∗, that is:24
q∗ =
−Iˆ(β − 1) + µhAr(1−λ)
λ
[1− β(1− δ)] + Apt−1(1− β)
[
µh − (1− δ)
]
βIˆ
(12)
And we can see from Figure 3 that q∗(δ) is monotonically and continuously
increasing in δ. From this, we can conclude with the following proposition:
Proposition 1
If we assume assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then, for all q 6= q∗, there exists a
unique pure strategy Markov Perfect Equilibrium such that: if q < q∗, then
the revolutionary threat will be met by the strategy of extending the franchise.
This is so because the probability of having a high revolutionary threat in the
future is low, and therefore the value of a revolution for the poor is higher
than the expected value of receiving a maximum investment. Because this
only happens q < q∗ times, the elite then have no other choice than to extend
the franchise, if they want to avoid a revolution.
Formally, the equilibrium strategies of the poor and the rich, when q < q∗,
look like this: The rich play: σr(µl, E) = (φ = 0, Ir = 0), and σr(µh, E) =
(φ = 1, [Ir = 0]). While the strategy of the poor is: σp(E, µh, Apt−1|φ = 0, Ir =
Iˆ) = (ρ = 1), and σp(E, µh, Apt−1|φ = 1, [Ir = 0]) = (ρ = 0, I = Iˆ), and the
last poor equilibrium strategy is to play σp(D,µh, Apt−1) = (I = Iˆ) when in
democracy.
If, however, q > q∗, then temporary redistribution, in the form of invest-
24See Appendix A.3 for the math
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ments and not a franchise extension, is enough to prevent revolution. This
is because the probability of getting a future transfer is above the threshold,
q∗, and therefore the long term value of getting investments from time to
time is larger than the payoff of a revolution for the poor. More formally:
σr(µl, E) = (φ = 0, Ir = 0), and σr(µh, E) = (φ = 0, Ir = I¯), where I¯ ≤ Iˆ
is the level of investment that makes the poor indifferent between revolu-
tion and this investment. Further, the strategy of the poor looks like this:
σp(µh, Apt−1, E|φ = 0, Ir) = (ρ = 0) for all Ir ≥ I¯. Logically we here also
see that the strategy σp(µh, E,Apt−1|φ = 0, Ir) = (ρ = 1) for all Ir ≤ I¯ is
the right response to a too low level of investment from the rich, but both of
these strategies are off the equilibrium path.
Assuming the elite are in power and q < q∗, then the rich set the investments
to zero when µ = µl, and extend the franchise when µ = µh. The poor play
the optimal strategy of revolting if µ = µh and the franchise has not been
extended. Otherwise, that is µ = µl, they don’t revolt. And as we remember,
the median poor voter sets the level of investment I = Iˆ after the franchise
has been extended.
In contrast, whenever the elite are in power and q > q∗, the rich can prevent
a revolution by investing. So in the state µ = µl the rich set the investment
level equal to zero, and do not extend the franchise. And when µ = µh,
they set the investment level, Ir = I¯, that is; just high enough to prevent a
revolution.
There is at least two main conclusions to be drawn from this analysis.
Firstly, the elite might extend the franchise when q < q∗ and the revolution-
ary threat becomes high. Even though this commits the elite to a high tax
burden in perpetuity, it is still preferable to a revolution. This is a result
of the argument I have use throughout the thesis: the poor don’t trust the
elite and a promise of future investments from the rich to the poor when
the threat of revolution is high at the moment, is not credible. Therefore if
the rich believe that the poor would actually choose to revolt, the optimal
strategy for the rich is to extend the franchise.
25
The other main conclusion is perhaps somewhat paradoxical; a high q makes
democratization less likely. This is because a high q actually leads to a stable
redistribution from the rich to the poor, because the rich would choose to
invest “sufficiently often” to satisfy the poor, and therefore a high q does
not lead to democracy but to frequent investments. This is opposite from
what I would assume was the normal intuition. In other words, a high level
of revolutionary threat can in it self work as a form of commitment device
by “reminding” the elite that the poor might revolt next time. It is perhaps
helpful to think of a high q as a society where the poor are well organized, or
perhaps a country where the neighbouring, and similar, countries just had a
revolution.25
4.1 Comparative Statics
It is important to notice that if the value of µh increases, this tightens the
revolution constraint, i.e. it is more difficult for the elite to use investments
to avoid a revolution. When q < q∗ this has no effect at first, since the threat
of revolution already made the elite choose to extend the franchise.
If we instead examine the situation where q > q∗, we see that a higher level
of µh increases the level of investments the rich need to make to appease the
poor, but it does not force them to extend the franchise since the probability
of a high revolutionary threat is sufficiently large. It is also important to
note that it is possible for µh to be so large that Assumption 2 would be
violated, and there would not be possible for the elite to prevent revolution
even with democratization, because the value for the poor of going through
with a revolution would be larger than the value of living in a democracy.
Another variable it is interesting to examine is Br. An increase will limit
the amount of investment the rich as a group can be forced to supply, and
therefore, as Br increases, it will be harder and harder to use redistribution to
appease the poor with temporary investments, because the taxes that can be
25Again it is tempting to refer to the Arab Spring and the various reactions of the
regimes around Tunisia.
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gathered from the rich are lower. The general conclusion that can be drawn
from this is that it is more difficult to prevent revolution where democracy
creates only limited gains for the citizens.26
4.1.1 The Effect of δ
All of the previous results in Section 4, however, are modified by the fact that
I have a model with depreciation. Whether q is below or above q∗, changes
with the level of δ, because the q∗, (that decides which of these policies that
are viable), is dependent on the level of δ. Figure 4 is thus a good summary
of the main result of the expanded model.
As we see in Figure 3 below27, the level of depreciation drastically changes
the action space for the policies of the elite.
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Figure 3: The figure illustrates how the level of q∗ depends on δ. As we see, if q is
larger than q∗ for any level of δ, Investments would be enough to prevent revolution. If,
however, q is less than q∗, for any level of δ, then democratization is the only way to
prevent revolution.
26see Section 6.3.1 for more about this effect
27See the Appendix A.4 for the numerical values used
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As the caption of Figure 3 says, this illustrates the action space for the elite,
and thus how much leeway the elite have depending on the level of q relative
to q∗.
The next figure, Figure 4 below, is almost the same as Figure 3, but I here
illustrated the difference between the Transfer approach from A&R with full
depreciation and the approach I use with Investments and limited deprecia-
tion. We see that the area labeled ‘Transfers and Investments’ is the same in
both models, but the area labeled ‘Investments’ only exists in the expanded
model. And as wee see, the level of q > q∗ needed when δ = 1 and the level
of q > q∗ for δ = 0 is substantially different. With δ = 0, q > q∗(0) is enough,
but with δ = 1, q > q∗(1) is required, to be able to prevent revolution.
0 0.5 1 δ
q∗(0)
q∗(1)
q
Investments
Transfers or Investment
Democratization
q
q∗(δ)
Depreciation δ
Figure 4: Here I have illustrated the difference between the Transfer approach from A&R
with full depreciation, and the approach I use with Investments and depreciation. We see
that the area labeled ‘Transfers and Investments’ are the same in both models, But the
area labeled ‘Investments’ only exists in the expanded model.
As we have seen, the inclusion of durable investments and the increased level
of commitment this allows the elite to show, is dependent on the level of
depreciation δ, since the level of depreciation decides the durability of the
productivity gain the poor get from the investment. In other words δ decides
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the level of commitment the elite are able to give. Since q∗ increases in δ,
the bigger δ the less of a commitment device the investments become, and
the harder it is to use investments to overcome the revolutionary threat. If,
however, the depreciation is a hundred percent each period, then there is no
real difference between the A&R approach with transfers, and the expanded
model with Investment, since there is no commitment possibilities. In other
words the basic A&R model turns out to be just a special case of the more
general expanded model whenever δ equals 1.
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5 China
5.1 Introduction
I want to build the argument that historically the Chinese had a huge sense
of moral and cultural superiority, and that the last two hundred years are a
low point in their historical development. Further I will argue that this is
of vital importance to understanding the framework the Chinese leaders act
within today28.
This section provides a short overview of Chinese history, before the next
section proceeds to apply the expanded model to China, and explains some
of the insights the model gives about how the relationship between the elite
and the citizens of China is shaped today.
In the 1820’s, before the First Opium War, China was the world’s largest
economy with 33% of world GDP. At the same time, Western Europe and
the USA had 17% and 2% of world production, respectively. With 20% of
the world’s population today, it would be ‘natural’ for China to have at least
20% of world’s production as well. But with a share of only 9%, China still
has a long way to go. This section tells some of the story of why China ended
up so poor compared to the western powers.
As we see from the recent 2009 numbers, China was the 98th largest economy
in per capita GDP. A level of GDP, that is 16 times the 1978 level, entail-
ing an average growth of 10 percent a year for thirty years. Despite these
achievements, it is still a paradox that China on one hand, is the world’s
second largest economy in absolute numbers, and on the other hand it is
barely in the top hundred, when we measure by GDP per capita (Bekkevold,
Kristoffersen, 2012, p. 14).
Nonetheless it is important to remember just how far China has come in
28Even though I am tempted to quote the old maxim that; “Those who cannot remember
the past are condemned to repeat it” (Santayana, George, 1906, p. 284), and use this as
the sole reason to have a bit of Chinese history in my thesis.
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the last twenty years. Even as late as 1992, Deng, extolled that the “four
big items it was essential to make available to consumers in the countryside
were: a bicycle, a sewing machine, a radio, and a wristwatch.” (Kissinger,
2011, p. 447). And we now know that even though the richest Chinese still
live in the coastal areas, the living standards have improved tremendously
also in the countryside. During the last two decades more than 600 million
people have been lifted out of poverty, and one of the world’s last communist
regimes is in most respects in fact capitalist, albeit not a democratic, country
(Bjerkholt, 2012, p. 43).
How did this transformation take place, and why did this transformation
happen? These questions are big enough to warrant several papers on just
one of them alone, so I can do no more than to sketch the shadow of an
answer here, but I still think the exercise is useful to understand at least
some of the motivation for the elite and their choices regarding China. A brief
examination of the historic foundation of China and the Chinese Communist
Party, shows how and why the CCP came into power, and that the death of
Mao opened up the possibility for the elite to embark on economic reform.
This again created the necessary prosperity to make a social contract possible.
5.2 Chinese History
5.2.1 Entering the Modern Era
For several hundred years the Chinese had the world’s leading economy and
a flourishing culture. Even when they were threatened, or even conquered
by barbarians, the would-be-conquerors themselves soon became “sinified”,
and things continued much as it always had. Kissinger sums it up like this:
China was severed from the general historical development [of
the world] [. . . ] within these distinctive traditions and millennial
habits of superiority, China entered the modern age a singular
kind of empire: a state claiming universal relevance for its cul-
ture and institutions but making few efforts to proselytize; the
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wealthiest country in the world but one that was indifferent to
foreign trade and technological innovation [. . . ] a political unit
of unparalleled geographic extent that was unaware of the tech-
nological and historical currents that would soon threaten its ex-
istence (2011, p. 37-38).
Then the Europeans came. And, for the first time, the Chinese faced a
threat from someone that did not recognize the moral and natural superiority
of China, and that were not interested in assimilation based on Chinese
culture or values. This difference in perspectives led to the First and Second
Opium Wars, when China tried to stop the British selling opium inside China.
Unfortunately China remained absolutist even after these losses, without
the war forcing the transition that e.g. Japan undertook during the Meiji
Restoration (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012, p.294-297).
As the nineteenth century progressed further, China experienced almost ev-
ery imaginable shock to its historic self image. Before the Opium War, it
conceived of diplomacy and international trade mainly as forms of recogni-
tion of China’s preeminence. Now, even as it entered a period of domestic
turmoil, it faced three distinct and dangerous foreign challenges: the West-
ern powers that wanted economic concessions, an expansionist and militarily
dominant Russia, and the largest threat: the Japanese.
[. . . ] neither the Western powers nor Russia had any ambition
to displace the [Chinese Qing empire] and claim the Mandate
of Heaven29; ultimately they reached the conclusion that they
had much to lose from the Qings fall. Japan, by contrast, had
no vested interest in the survival of Chinas ancient institutions
or the Sinocentric world order. From the east it set out not
29The Emperor’s second, metaphysical, role was his status as the “Son of Heaven, the
symbolic intermediary between Heaven, Earth, and humanity. This role also implied moral
obligation on the Emperor’s part. [. . . ] If the Emperor strayed from the path of virtue,
All Under Heaven would fall into chaos. Even natural catastrophes might signify that
disharmony had beset the universe. The existing dynasty would be seen to have lost the
“Mandate of Heaven by which it possessed the right to govern: rebellions would break
out, and a new dynasty would restore the Great Harmony of the universe (Kissinger,
2011, p. 12).
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only to occupy significant portions of Chinese territory, but to
supplant Beijing as the center of a new East Asian international
order. The ensuing catastrophes are viewed with considerable
dismay in contemporary China, as part of an infamous “century of
humiliation”, that ended only by the reunification of the country
under an assertively nationalist form of Communism (Kissinger,
2011, p. 51)[my emphasis].
A direct consequence of this inability to adapt to a changing world30, was the
breakdown of the last Chinese empire, and a chaotic period with warlords in
control of huge areas. This state of affairs endured up until the communist
victory in the civil war.
5.2.2 World War II
In 1931 Japan invaded Manchuria. The war was as mentioned the result of
a decades-long Japanese imperialist policy aiming to dominate China polit-
ically and militarily and to secure access to China’s vast natural resources.
Although the two countries had fought since before 1931, war was not de-
clared before 1937, and did not end before the surrender of Japan in 1945.
In the meantime the Chinese government was fractured and weak. The Na-
tionalists, the Communists, and various warlords were engaged in infighting,
and were therefore not prepared for war. This led the Japanese to capture
large areas of China, and eventually even the Chinese capital of Nan-king
(Dupuy, and Dupuy, p. 1125).
There was resistance against the Japanese both by the Nationalists, under
30“The pretensions underlying this traditional Chinese world order endured well into
the modern era. As late as 1863, Chinas Emperor dispatched a letter informing Abraham
Lincoln of Chinas commitment to good relations with the United States. The Emperor
based his communication on the grandiloquent assurance that, [h]aving, with reverence,
received the commission from Heaven to rule the universe, we regard both the middle
empire [China] and the outside countries as constituting one family, without any distinc-
tion. “When the letter was dispatched, China had already lost two wars with the Western
powers, which were busy staking out spheres of interest in Chinese territory. The Emperor
seems to have treated these catastrophes as similar to other barbarian invasions that were
overcome, in the end, by Chinas endurance and superior culture.” (Kissinger, 2011, p. 9).
33
Chiang Kai-Shek, and the Communists, under Mao. The communists con-
ducted guerrilla warfare, with soldiers based behind the Japanese lines. This
strategy worked well and therefore gained huge popular support. The best
way to see this effect is perhaps to compare the party membership numbers,
which increased from 100,000 in 1937 to 1.2 million by 1945. The relevance
of the Japanese invasion for the eventual communist takeover of China, can
probably best be summarized by Mao himself:
Mao’s policies permitted the Japanese to destroy the Nationalists
and thus strengthen the Communists, [. . . ], ‘Mao credited Japan
with the communist victory in the civil war.’ When Japanese
premier Kakuei Tanaka ‘tried to apologize for his country’s inva-
sion of China, Mao assured him that it was the “help” of the
Japanese invasion that made the communist victory and this
visit between communist and Japanese leaders possible’ (Wal-
dron, 1996, p. 972).
5.2.3 China Under Mao
After the Chinese civil war and the victory over the nationalists, Mao had
total control over the party, and thus China. The communists had restored
China to its historical borders, beaten back the Japanese and eliminated
anyone who could threaten their control. Their ideological dominance was
complete. Under Mao’s leadership China had reached the early stages of
communism; Soviet style five year plans were introduced, collectivization
and nationalization had been completed, the bourgeois no longer existed,
and class warfare had ended” (Vogel, 2011, p. 39).
Mao used this period to introduce several important reforms, for example
“The Great Leap Forward” where 30 million Chinese died, without any real
industrial gain, and “The Hundred Flowers Campaign”, where the CCP en-
couraged a variety of views and solutions to national policy issues, launched
under the slogan: “Letting a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools
of thought contend”. But when people surprised Mao with the dept of their
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criticism and even dared to criticize the “Great Helmsman” himself, there
was a back clash in a huge “anti rightist campaign” where Mao discredited
everyone who had been openly or implicitly critical of the party and Mao’s
ideas (Vogel, 2011, p. 40).
But the biggest threat to stability ended up being the Cultural Revolution
and its consequences.
5.2.4 The Cultural Revolution
During 1966 and until 1968, Mao encouraged youths to rise up against their
elder leaders, allegedly to prevent rightist elements. Anyone with any edu-
cation were to go and learn the value of physical work in the countryside,
while inexperienced but zealous youths, called the Red Guards, took over
vital positions. This caused Mao’s personality cult to grow to immense pro-
portions. Even Deng Xiaoping, widely regarded as a possible successor and a
Mao supporter from before the Long March, was put through severe criticism
and ended up repairing tractors in the countryside for tree and a half years.
The result of the Cultural Revolution was utter chaos, and it ended with
Mao having to disperse the youths back to the countryside (Vogel, 2011,
p. 35-55). Despite all this, the Cultural Revolution, to some extent, worked
as intended and conciliated Mao’s rule. The fear of being labeled “rightist”
prevented anyone from deviating from Mao’s intended policies. But the costs
were immense, it created a lost generation of intellectuals, since everyone
with any skill was sent to the countryside, or assaulted by the Red Guards.
Deng later described the Cultural revolution as being a form of “civil war”
(Xiaoping, 1994, p. 359).
5.2.5 The Era of Deng Xiaoping
In march 1979, the country was still reeling from the Cultural Revolution
where, as we saw, high-level officials had been attacked, and with Mao’s
support, pushed aside, as the country with almost one billion people were
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plunged into chaos. The average per capita income of Chinese peasants, that
still comprised 80 percent of the population, was at 40$ a year. The amount
of grain produced per person had fallen below the level before the Great Leap
Forward, and was at 1957 levels. Factories were operating with technology
that came from the Soviets in the 50’s. Military officials had civilian jobs,
revolutionaries had taken over jobs they had neither the education nor knowl-
edge to perform, and the transportation and communication infrastructure
was not working (Vogel, 2011, p.1-2).
It was in this situation Deng Xiaoping, after the death of Mao, eventually
gained the mantle as China’s undisputed leader. And Deng set out to reform
the country, since he believed that China desperately needed radical reform
to fix these problems. He also realized that “one could not solve problems
simply by opening markets: one had to build institutions gradually, [. . . ]
to provide order during this rebuilding, [Deng] believed there was only one
organization that could manage the process - the Communist Party” (Vogel,
2011, p. 3)[my emphasis].
Deng broke with the precedent set by Mao by downplaying his own expertise
rather than presenting himself as a genius in any particular field. He trusted
his subordinates to innovate, then endorsed what worked (Kissinger, 2011,
p. 344). Deng did not have a clear blueprint of how to bring wealth to the
people and power and stability to the country. He did, however, see improving
the standard of living and enhancing productivity as the best guarantee of
social stability” (Kissinger, 2011, p. 444). So it was with this background
that Deng launched his program of the four modernizations, that eventually
led to greater prosperity and growth than even the most optimistic forecaster
could imagine, with a Chinese GDP that is set to overtake the GDP of the
US already in 201731, according to one of the latest IMF reports (IMF, World
Economic Outlook, 2011).
31In PPP terms.
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6 Applying the Expanded Model to China
6.1 Introduction
In this section I am going to apply the expanded model on China to shed
some light on certain aspects of China’s development. I will argue that the
focus on investment driven growth that the CCP has had since the reforms
began in 1978, is because of an implicit social contract that gives the CCP
the ‘mandate of heaven’ as long as they deliver increased prosperity to the
people.
6.2 Fear of Revolutions
“Men must be either crushed or pampered”
This quote by Machiavelli from ‘The Prince’, (1981, p. 37) stays as fresh to-
day as it was five hundred years ago; the choice, for the ruling elite, is indeed
between repression or some concession in one form or another. As I have ar-
gued in the preceding paragraphs the “legitimacy [of the CCP] now depended
in part on delivering China’s people a measure of wealth and comfort and
a respite from the previous century of upheavals and privations”(Kissinger,
2011, p. 502). This is the main argument in my thesis of why the investment
lead growth model is chosen in China. The CCP saw that they needed to
change the way they governed to continue to control China.
As mentioned, Deng thought only the CCP could manage the necessary
transition into “socialism with Chinese characteristics”, the alternative would
be no reform and then chaos. So when the reforms began it was vital that
they created results fast. And as we have seen, they did; between 1978
and 1984, the income of Chinese peasants doubled (Kissinger, 2011, p. 406).
The economic reforms managed to create enough wealth for the citizens to
prevent rebellion, but the CCP still did not feel safe. When the zeal of
economic reform slowed down in the beginning of the 1990s, Deng entered
37
the central stage again. In his famous ‘Southern Tour’ in 1992, Deng argued
that economic reform and development were fundamentally revolutionary
acts: “abandoning reform”, Deng warned, would lead China down a “blind
alley”. To quote Deng directly:
“Any one who attempted to change the line, principles and poli-
cies adopted since [the reforms began in 78] would not be coun-
tenanced by the people; he would be toppled. I have said this
several times. Had it not been for the achievements of the reform
and the open policy, we could not have weathered June 4th. And
if we had failed that test, there would have been chaos and civil
war. The ”cultural revolution” was a civil war. Why was it that
our country could remain stable after the June 4th Incident? It
was precisely because we had carried out the reform and the open
policy, which have promoted economic growth and raised living
standards.” (1994, p. 359)[My emphasis].
He argued that in order to “win the trust and support of the people,” the pro-
gram of economic liberalization must continue for “a hundred years”. Reform
and opening up, Deng insisted, had allowed the Peoples Republic to avoid
civil war in 1989 (Xiaoping, 1994, p. 358-362). We see here that the CCP did
not feel safe unless the economic reforms continued, and the commitment to
the path of economic development was one of the key messages that Deng
wanted to get through.
The reference to “the June 4th Incident” is a reference to the Tienanmen
square incident, where several thousands of protesters gathered to protest,
rising inflation and lack of jobs. The protesters called for more economic
reform, before the protests eventually morphed into a mass movement for
political reform and freedom of the press. The CCP ended up using the
army to clear the streets of Beijing, and they are widely considered to have
seen this peaceful protest as a serious challenge to their rule32 (Kissinger,
2011, p. 425-428).
32See for example Deng’s comment in the quote above.
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A&R also argue in ‘Economic Origins’ that crises, economic, or otherwise,
increase the likelihood of transition from one form of government to another
(Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006, p. 65). It is awfully tempting to interpret,
for example China’s rather extreme stimulus program in response to the
recent financial crisis, as an effect of just this kind of mechanism. Because
the Chinese are more worried than democracies of sudden change, they are
more focused on their response to the crisis. And if we look at the numbers33,
we see that China’s response to the crisis was substantially larger than the
western democracies. This might just be an effect of a autocracy in itself,
because they do not need to water down a deal to get it through e.g. the US
Congress, but it is equally likely that because they are more worried about
unrest, they had a response that made sure that the effects of the crisis were
as small as possible.
One more example that promotes the fact that the CCP is concerned with
rebellions, is the fact that the regime recently arrested several people and
shut down more than 15 websites because they spread rumours that military
vehicles where on the streets of Beijing the 31th of March this year. The
rumors came because one of the main contenders for promotion within the
CCP - Bo Xilai - in the once-in-a-decade leadership change later this year,
had just been sacked. This suggest a fierce fight behind the scenes for control
of the ruling positions within the CCP. The People’s Daily, the party’s main
newspaper, said in a commentary: “Internet rumours and lies packaged as
‘facts’ will turn conjecture into ‘reality,’ stir up trouble online and disturb
people’s minds.[. . . ] If allowed to run amok, they will seriously disrupt social
order, affect social stability and harm social integrity” (BBC News China,
2012). The CCP are in other words continually worried about unrest. In
the next section I illustrate the choices of the CCP through the eyes of the
expanded model.
33“China’s new bailout package has been set up to make the US government look cheap.
At $586 billion its ratio to GDP is impressive. [. . . ] An American equivalent would have
to total at least $2.4 trillion. So far, the US government has settled on the $700 billion”
(McIntyre (2008)).
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6.3 Repression or Investment
Acemoglu and Robinson argue that: “The Chinese experience is an example
of growth under extractive political institutions” (Acemoglu and Robinson,
2012, p. 439). They further argue that this is mainly because property rights
are not entirely secure and labor movement is not free but regulated through
e.g. the hukou system34. They assert that China’s economic system is more
inclusive than for example Soviet’s old system, but claim that since the CCP
is still all powerful, there are no real inclusive institutions and thus no social
contract in China (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012, p. 440).
Fukyama, on the other hand, claims that the Acemoglu and Robinson model
and the approach they use can not adequately explain the growth spur of
China. He states that: “A&R pull a sleight of hand by arguing that Chinese
growth won’t last and that their system will eventually come crashing down
(like Rome did, after about 200 years?)”. He argues that a model that can
not explain China’s growth is not very convincing (Fukuyama, 2012).
In short, A&R claim that China is using repression to stay in control. They
agree that China has taken steps towards inclusive institutions after 1978,
but they still argue that:
[. . . ] there are grounds to be skeptical that there is a social
contract in China where the Communist Party will refrain from
acting in ways that damages the economy. The Party controls the
judiciary, the military, the bureaucracy and the media. So even if
they claim their authority from a social contract, the moment this
supposed contract strongly conflicts with the interests of those at
the helm, the chances are that it will be worth not much more
than the paper it’s written on (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012).
This statement only makes sense if one uses the A&R model from Section
2, and if we further imagine that the reasoning of A&R is that China has
the opportunity to repress as a first choice. Therefore if we examine the
34see for example Kam Wing Chan and Buckingham, Will (2008) for more information
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game tree representing my game, Figure 2, this tree spouts from an even
larger tree, Figure 5 below, where the elite first have to choose between; not
repressing the population: (Repress) or repressing the population: Repress.
If Repress is chosen then we don’t even move down the branches that leads
to where my model is. If however the elite choose to Repress, then we start
on the game that I have examined throughout this thesis. We can illustrate
this preliminary choice in a game tree as we see in Figure 5, below, where
A&R believe that R > T , and the elite will therefore choose repression.
Elites
Repress
A game with Investments/Transfers (T)
Repress
A repression game (R)
Figure 5: This is a basic game where if we assume that R > T , the Elite would choose
Repress as their strategy. If, on the other hand, R < T it is in the interest of the elite to
play Repress.
If we now instead revisit Figure 3 in Section 4.1.1, and imagine that we
operate with, e.g. 10 percent depreciation, then the difference between A&R
where, δ = 1 and my model, where δ = 0.1, is quite considerable. As we see
in Figure 6 below, there’s is a big difference in the conclusions one would draw
when one thinks of China using a model with full depreciation, or a model
with low depreciation. The whole triangle, labeled ‘Increased Flexibility for
the Elite’, is the difference for the elite between A&R’s model with transfers,
and my expanded model.
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Figure 6: Here we see the difference between the A&R model and the expanded model.
The area labeled ‘Increased Flexibility for the Elite’ only exist in the expanded model, and
this gives the elite a larger action space, an extra area, where they can use Investments to
prevent a revolution.
Since China had almost no infrastructure in 1978, before Deng’s reforms
began, it is not unreasonable to imagine that they had a low rate of depreci-
ation, since the depreciation cost of low levels of capital is normally assumed
to be close to zero. In other words, if the area ‘Increased Flexibility for the
Elite’ above, is large enough to increase the payoff of the elite sufficiently to
choose Repress in the game in Figure 5, the conclusion we came to in the
previous paragraph would change. Because of the increased leeway for the
elite, they might now instead value T > R, and they would opt for increased
economic interaction and the use of investments to placate the populace in-
stead of using repression, because this gives wider flexibility and a larger
economy to extract rents from.
This is exactly what I argue that China did from 1978 and forward, and
the reason A&R don’t come to the same conclusion is because their model
use transfers instead of durable investments. Since investments increase the
ability of the elite to commit, the payoff of playing Repress increases, and we
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end up with the dynamics we have examined thoroughly throughout Section
3.
As we have seen through my focus on investments and depreciation, the elite
have a larger playing field within the expanded model, and this makes it
more desirable to move down the game tree in Figure 5, above, on the non-
repressive route, than in the basic A&R model. And this extra space makes
the argument for the existence of an implicit social social contract stronger.
6.3.1 Increasing Br
It is also interesting to examine some of the more technical aspects of the
model and how they might interact with the ‘real world’. It is especially
interesting to see that something the model uses as an important foundation
can be found outside the model. As we might remember, the level of Br
determines how much the rich can earn in the “non market sector”.
The relevance in the theoretical framework for this is that Br serves as a
reference point, and a way to limit the poor from taxing the rich the full
amount of their income in a democracy, as well as limiting the total level of
investments it is possible to make the elite pay. Therefore it is very inter-
esting to see that the top 10 % richest people in China in 2008, earn 66%
of their total income from the gray economy. In other words, China has a
“hidden” economy of 98 thousand million yuan, almost 30% of total GDP,
where two thirds of the income from this sector accrue to the richest ten
percent (Bekkevold, 2012, p. 101-102).
The logic behind this within my framework would be that the rich are “po-
sitioning” themselves for a eventual democracy, and are working to increase
the income they will have in the future. This would be equivalent to the rich
being able to increase the value of Br in my model, and even though this is
not something I have opened up for in my framework, since the main focus
of the model is on the actions of the poor, it might have been an interesting
extension. As we discussed in Section 4.1, this would increase the future pay-
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off of not having democracy for the elite, and therefore making them more
willing to pay more now. But the problem is that they are limited in what
it is individually rational to pay now, and the increased Br would lower this
amount. Therefore the actions of the elite are uncertain, and I might have
had to change the “rules of the game” and how I model this, if I were to
adhere to the possibility to change B.
But if we use some comparative statics and compare two economies where
everything is equal but the level of Br, we see that the rich are better off
individually if Br change, but we also see that since this change lowers the
value of Iˆ, it would also help ferment rebellion35, since the rewards in democ-
racy goes down, making Assumption 2 less likely to hold. If we differentiate
Equation (7), that is the value for the poor of having a high revolutionary
threat when the elite rule, with respect to Br, we see that the effect comes
through maximum investment: Iˆ = Ar − Br, and that the differential of Iˆ
with respect to Br is less than zero, and that the value for the poor obviously
goes down from an increase in Br.
It is also possible to examine an increase in Br graphically. An increase
would shift the level of q∗(δ) upwards in i.e. Figure 6. It would also reduce
the max transfer that the rich can pay in any one period, so if the level of δ
is high (that is a move to the right along the curve q∗(δ) in Figure 6), this
further complicates the ability of the elite to use investments as a device to
prevent revolution.
All of this would indicate that the Gini-coefficient within China might be
more than 0,5, that is that the elite now have more than 50 percent of the
total wealth, something that traditionally means that there is a great risk
of social unrest. And indeed the number of people protesting against the
increased income gap have increased substantially in recent years. So even
if it is individually logical to work to increase your Br, it is not collectively
35“A recent survey of 980 Chinese millionaires found that 46 percent of them were con-
sidering leaving China and another 14 percent had already emigrated or were completing
the paperwork for relocating [. . . ] Many potential emigrants, not surprisingly, are working
on a Plan B in case [of] widespread social unrest takes hold or the political winds begin
to blow against them.” Pettis (2012)
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optimal. We can speculate that an attempt to change this dynamic might
be one of the real motives behind the new five year plan, with the new focus
on welfare and not just growth in GDP 36.
6.4 An Investment Driven Economy
As we have seen, the Chinese model of growth has mainly been driven by
investments from the government and growth through a massive export in-
dustry. China can reasonably be described as ‘the world’s factory’, and the
claim that most of our consumption goods are labeled ‘made in China’ is not
an understatement. But this model of growth, despite its apparent success,
has not been without its costs.
The greatest winners of the early reforms were the farmers. They suddenly
got the right incentives and were allowed to sell their surplus production
on the market. This led to the countryside taking the lead in the early
income growth. But as the Chinese economy has changed to more and more
investment and export focused growth, the countryside lost out. The average
income in the countryside, even though it has increased substantially, is now
just one third of the average income of the city dwellers, and the highest
income is found in the cities on the coast, such as Shanghai, which have have
an average income of five times that on the countryside (Bekkevold, 2012,
p. 100).
During the last decade, consumption as a proportion of GDP has fallen with
over ten percent. The marginal propensity to save has gone from an already
historic high of 40, that is people save 40 cents of every dollar they earn37, to
a propensity to save of close to 60 percent (Guonan Ma and Wang Yi, 2010).
This means that investments in production capacity and infrastructure have
been prioritized before welfare enhancing services to the citizens.
To create the required transportation systems, expand the production ca-
36See for example Chapter 5 in Bekkevold, Kristoffersen (2012) for more about this.
37In comparison, a US citizens spent marginally more than a dollar per dollar earned,
before the financial crisis.
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pacity, and create the necessary infrastructure for growth, a country needs
to have hight levels of investments in the beginning. After this period it is
common to have investments relative to consumption to fall, and consump-
tion starting to carry the demand side of the economy, but this has not yet
happened in China. To give an example, China recently reached a level of
GDP of 1000$ per capita, but they have an investment rate of more than
42 percent. In comparison, Japan and South Korea had an investment rate
of 33 percent and 29 percent, respectively, when they had the same level of
GDP per capita. In other words, the propensity to consume is still a lot
lower in China than in comparable countries, and the economy is still mainly
driven by investments.
One of the chief reasons for this high level of savings is the change in the
provision of government services. Traditionally, the Chinese government took
care of the citizens from the cradle to the grave, with free education, free
health care, and guaranteed employment. This system was called the “iron
rice bowl”. But the iron rice bowl emptied in the 1990’s, and a system where
people had to pay for these services replaced the old system. In addition,
this new system basically only worked in the urban areas, further increasing
the discrepancies between the cities and the countryside (Bekkevold, 2012,
p. 103). So a ‘normal’ Chinese citizen is forced to save. They must save
towards the child’s education, to provide for their parents, and to be able to
handle unforeseen expenditures like health care (Moody, 2012).
If we then add the two hundred million migrant workers to this equation,
and realize that these have even less access to basic social services, since
they work outside their home district38, we see that the incentive to save in
this rather large part of the population is even higher. They are forced to
save more, because they can rely even less on the state providing any services
(Bekkevold, 2012, p. 105-107).
A high level of savings and the resulting investment level are some of the
motivations for creating a model based on investments and not just transfers.
38This is also a consequence of the Huoku system
46
We might imagine that the people ‘agree’ to sacrifice some short term benefits
for increased growth in the long run, and this is best captured in my expanded
model. I would argue that the investment focused growth path is a good
validation for the approach the expanded model took towards China.
But changes might be soon to come. The latest five year plan for the pe-
riod 2011-2015, accepted in the People’s Congress in March 2011, gives clear
signals of a more consumption driven growth model with more focus on pro-
viding welfare. The goal is the creation of a middle class that could provide
enough internal demand to fuel the economy for years to come, without the
economy being so dependent on the high level of investments. This might
again make the investment approach less useful, but so far it has shown itself
to be a valid effort to describe the logic behind the Chinese growth miracle,
and the fact that the CCP still maintains the ‘mandate of heaven’.
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7 Concluding Remarks
Whenever I get stuck on a Chinese macro issue, I always go back
to two key words – social stability. They are, in many respects,
the Holy Grail of the Chinese growth miracle. I remain abso-
lutely convinced that China’s leadership would do everything in
its power to avoid destabilizing the social fabric of the nation’s
vast population (Roach, 2012).
This quote sums up my main argument. The elite in China are obsessed with
social stability. This is both because of historical experiences, and because
in order to create growth, stability is a main requirement. In this thesis,
I have examined whether a model that use durable investments instead of
lump sum transfers can be used to better understand the framework behind
China’s economic growth. I use the framework developed in Acemoglu and
Robinson (2000), and argue that with some changes, this model is a good
tool to understand the dynamic between the elite and the citizens in China.
As we have seen, I accomplish this by first presenting the insights of A&R
(2000); that democratization is a consequence of the elite’s fear of rebellion.
The argument is that because it is impossible for the elite to commit to
future transfers, since they have incentives to break their promise as soon
as the revolutionary threat subsides. The only way the elite can credibly
commit is to give away their power to renege by creating i.e. a democracy.
The second insight we can draw from this model, is that a constant high
threat of revolution does not necessary lead to democratization, but might
help the elite keep power by ensuring a certain level of transfers to the poor.
This last insight is what, I argue, is keeping the elite in China on their toes.
Despite this prediction from their model, we saw that Acemoglu and Robin-
son do not agree that there is an implicit social contract in China. I argue
that this is because they focus on lump sum transfers in their models, and if
we instead let the elite be able to commit to some degree by adding durable
investments as an option to placate the people, we see that there is indeed
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good arguments for a social contract. I accomplish this by introducing in-
vestments that increases the productivity of the poor into the model. And
we see that it is easier for the elite to control the population and prevent
revolution, in a model with investments.
More formally, I show that if we build an infinite horizon dynamic model,
the inclusion of durable investments and the increased level of commitment
this allows the elite to show is dependent on the level of depreciation, δ.
Since the level of depreciation decides the durability of the productivity gain
the poor get from the investment, the level of depreciation gives an upper
limit to the level of commitment that the elite are able to reach. We saw
that since q increases in δ, the larger δ, the less of a commitment device the
investments become, and the harder it is to use investments to overcome the
revolutionary threat.
We also saw that if depreciation is a hundred percent each period, then
there is no real difference between the A&R approach with transfers and the
extended model with investment, since there is no commitment possibilities.
In other words the A&R model turns out to be just a special case of the more
general extended model where δ equals 1.
In sum, the expanded model can be said to give a good description of the
possible dynamics between the elite and the citizens of China. The inclusion
of investment driven growth to create social stability, and the argument that
the lessons of history causes social stability to be important, is at least some-
thing that Deng Xiaoping, the architect behind China’s reforms, argue was
the main motivation behind the investment driven growth path. And even
though China has gone through huge changes and faced enormous challenges,
the last 40 years, the CCP has so far proved adept at using the tools they
have at hand to provide growth, and thereby continue to control both the
world’s second largest economy and the most populous country.
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A Appendix: Math
A.1 Sums
A.1.1 The Perpetual Discounted Value for the Poor of the Fran-
chise Being Extended
V p(Apt−1, D) =
∞∑
s=1
βs
[
(1− δ)sApt−1 +
s∑
τ=1
(1− δ)τ Iˆ(1− λ)
λ
]
+ Apt−1
We see that the ”inner sum”
∑s
τ=1(1− δ)τ (1−λ)λ Iˆ equals:
(1− δ)(1− λ)
λ
Iˆ
s−1∑
τ=0
(1− δ)τ
⇐⇒
1− δ
δ
Iˆ
(1− λ)
λ
(1− (1− δ)s)
⇐⇒
(1− δ)
δ
Iˆ
(1− λ)
λ
− (1− δ)
s+1
δ
Iˆ
(1− λ)
λ
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Continuing with the large expression, now with the solved ”inner sum”:
V p(Apt−1, D) =
Apt−1 +
∞∑
s=1
βs
[
(1− δ)s(Apt−1 −
(1− δ)
δ
Iˆ
(1− λ)
λ
) +
Iˆ(1− λ)
λ
]
⇐⇒
Apt−1 +
∞∑
s=1
[
β(1− δ)
]s(
Apt−1 −
Iˆ(1− λ)
λ
)
+
∞∑
s=1
βs
Iˆ(1− λ)
λ
⇐⇒
Apt−1 + β(1− δ)
{ ∞∑
s=1
[
β(1− δ)
]s−1(
Apt−1 −
Iˆ(1− λ)
λ
)}
+ β
∞∑
s=1
βs−1
Iˆ(1− λ)
λ
⇐⇒
Apt−1 + β(1− δ)
(
Apt−1 −
Iˆ(1− λ)
λ
)
+ β
(1− δ)
δ
Iˆ)
(1− λ)
λ
1
1− β
⇐⇒
Apt−1
( β(1− δ)
1− β(1− δ)) + 1
)
+ Iˆ
(1− λ)
λ
( β(1− δ)
(1− β)δ)) −
β(1− δ)(1− δ)
δ(1− β(1− δ)
)
⇐⇒
Apt−1
( 1
1− β(1− δ)
)
+ Iˆ
(1− λ)
λ
( β(1− δ)δ2
δ2(1− β(δ + β(1− δ)− 2)
)
After the last little bit of algebra, we then see that t at state Apt−1 is:
V p(D,Apt−1) =
Apt−1
1− β(1− δ) +
Iˆβ(1− δ)(1− λ)
(1− β[δ + β(1− δ)− 2])λ (13)
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A.1.2 The Perpetual Discounted Value of Revolution for the Poor
V p(Apt−1, R) = µ
[Apt−1λ+ Ar(1− λ)
λ
]
+
∞∑
s=1
βsµ
[Apt−1(1− δ)λ+ Ar(1− λ)
λ
]
⇐⇒
µ
[Apt−1λ+ Ar(1− λ)
λ
]
+
∞∑
s=1
[Ar(1− λ)
λ
]
βsµ+
∞∑
s=1
[
β(1− δ)
]sλApt−1µ
λ
⇐⇒
µ
[Apt−1λ+ Ar(1− λ)
λ
]
+
[Ar(1− λ)µ
λ
] β
1− β +
λApt−1µ
λ
β(1− δ)
1− β(1− δ)
After a bit of algebra, we then see that the perpetual discounted value of
revolting at state Apt−1 is:
V p(R,Apt−1) = µ
(Ar(1− λ)
λ(1− β) +
Apt−1
1− β(1− δ)
)
(14)
A.1.3 The Perpetual Value for the Poor of a One Time Max
Transfer
Here we see that the perpetual value for the poor of a one time maximum
transfer from the rich, equals:
Apt−1(1− δ) +
Iˆ(1− λ)
λ
+
∞∑
s=1
[
β(1− δ)
]s(
Apt−1 +
Iˆ(1− λ)
λ
)
⇐⇒
Apt−1(1− δ) +
Iˆ(1− λ)
λ
+
(Apt−1 + Iˆ(1− λ)λ
1− β(1− δ)
)
⇐⇒
Apt−1
{[(1− β(1− δ)](1− δ) + 1 + Iˆ(1− λ)
λ
1− β(1− δ)
}
+
Iˆ(1− λ)
λ
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A.2 Guess and Verify - Value Functions
These are the value functions for the citizens at the specified states, using
”guess and verify” to obtain the value functions. Equation (3) is here (I),
and Equation (7) is (II)
V p(µl, Apt−1, E) = A
p
t−1(1− δ)
+ β
[
(1− q)V p(Apt , µl, E) + qV p(Apt , µh, E)
]
(I)
V p(µh, Apt−1, E, I
r) = Apt−1(1− δ) + Ir
+ β
[
qV p(Apt , µ
h, E, Ir) + (1− q)V p(At, µl, E)
]
(II)
Guess:
V p(µl, Apt−1, E) = α0 + α1At−1 (A)
V p(µh, Apt−1, E) = γ0 + γ1At−1 (B)
Verify: Inserting (A) into (I) and (B) into (II).
α0 + α1At−1 = At−1(1− δ)
+ β
{
q[γ0 + γ1(1− δ)At−1]
+ (1− q)[α0 + α1(1− δ)At−1]
}
(I*)
γ0 + γ1At−1 = At−1(1− δ) + Iˆ
+ β{q[γ0 + γ1(1− δ)At−1 + Iˆ]
+ (1− q)[α0 + α1(1− δ)(At−1 + Iˆ)]} (II*)
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Rearranging Equation (I*), and Equation (II*):
α0 − βqγ0 − β(1− q)α0 =
{(1− δ)− α1 + βq(1− δ)γ1 + β(1− q)(1− δ)α1}At−1
γ0 − βqγ0 − β(1− q)α0 − Iˆ(1 + βqγ1 + β(1− q)α0 =
{(1− δ)− γ1 + βq(1− δ)γ1 + β(1− q)(1− δ)α1}At−1
We now see that for the expressions within the curly brackets to be 0, then
α1 = γ1. Thus we have:
(1− δ)− γ1 + β(1− δ)γ1 = 0
⇐⇒
γ1[1− β(1− δ)] = (1− δ)
⇐⇒
γ1 =
1− δ
1− β(1− δ) = α1
For the left hand side of Equation (I*) to be 0:
[1− β(1− q)α0 = βqγ0
⇐⇒
α0 =
βq
1− β(1− q)γ0 (IV)
Inserting the values for α1 and γ1 and setting the left hand side of Equation
(II*) = 0:
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1− βqγ0 − β(1− q) βq
1− β(1− q)γ0 =
Iˆ
[
1 + βq
1− δ
1− β(1− δ) + β(1− q)
1− δ
1− β(1− δ)
]
⇐⇒
γ0
[
(1− βq)− β(1− q)βq
1− β(1− q)
]
=
Iˆ
1− β(1− δ)
⇐⇒
(1− β)
1− β(1− q)γ0 =
Iˆ
1− β(1− δ)
⇐⇒
γ0 =
1− β(1− q)
1− β(1− δ)(1− β) Iˆ
Inserting back in Equation (IV), we get:
α0 =
βq
1− β(1− q)
1− β(1− q)
1− β(1− δ)(1− β) Iˆ
⇐⇒
α0 =
βq
(1− β(1− δ))(1− β) Iˆ
So now we know that the 4 equations we need look like this:
α0 =
βq
(1− β(1− δ))(1− β) Iˆ (15)
γ0 =
1− β(1− q)
(1− β(1− q))(1− β) Iˆ (16)
γ1 =
1− δ
1− β(1− δ) = α1 (17)
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So the end result is that the true form of Equation (3) is:
V p(Apt−1, µ
l, E, Iˆ) =
βq
(1− β(1− δ))(1− β) Iˆ +
1− δ
1− β(1− δ)A
p
t−1 (I**)
And the true form of Equation (7) is:
V p(Apt−1, µ
h, E, Iˆ) =
1− β(1− q)
(1− β(1− δ))(1− β) Iˆ +
1− δ
1− β(1− δ)A
p
t−1 (II**)
A.3 q∗(δ)
We know that q∗ is defined by: Vˆ p(Apt−1, µ
h, E|q∗) = V p(Apt−1, R)
That is:
1− β(1− q)
(1− β(1− δ))(1− β) Iˆ +
1− δ
1− β(1− δ)A
p
t−1 = µ
(Ar(1− λ)
λ(1− β) +
Apt−1
1− β(1− δ)
)
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By rearranging and solving for q∗ we get:
q∗ = − Iˆ(β − 1)
βIˆ
+{
µh
[Ar(1− λ)
λ(1− β) +
Apt−1
1− β(1− δ)
]
βIˆ
− (1− δ)A
p
t−1
1− β(1− δ)
}(
1− β(1− δ)
)(
1− β
)
βIˆ
⇐⇒
−Iˆ(β − 1) + µ
hAr(1− λ)
λ
[1− β(1− δ)]
βIˆ
+
Apt−1(1− β)
[
µh − (1− δ)
]
βIˆ
That is:
q∗ =
−Iˆ(β − 1) + µ
hAr(1− λ)
λ
[1− β(1− δ)] + Apt−1(1− β)
[
µh − (1− δ)
]
βIˆ
Which is the same as Equation (12) in Section 4 is therefore the expression
of q∗(δ) in Figure 3.
If we differentiate Equation (12), we see that we get:
∂q∗
∂δ
=
µhβAr(1− λ)
λ
+ Apt−1(1− β)
βIˆ
> 0
Which is strictly positive and independent of δ.
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A.4 The Values of Figure 3
In Figure 3, I have used the following values on my variables:
Apt−1 0, 8
Ar 2
β 0, 9
µh 0, 6
λ 0, 9
Iˆ 1
A.4.1 Various Shifts in the Values of Figure 3
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Figure 7: Here we see the difference between the q∗(δ) that uses the values from Section
A.4, and a q∗(δ) where µh is lowered from 0,6 to 0,3. And a q∗ where β is lowered from
0,9 to 0,8
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